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Abstract—This work applies reinforcement learning (RL) from the AI machine learning field to derive an optimal Bitcoin-like blockchain
mining strategy without knowing the details of the blockchain network model. Previously, the most profitable mining strategy was
believed to be honest mining encoded in the default blockchain protocol. It was shown later that it is possible to gain more mining
rewards by deviating from honest mining. In particular, the mining problem can be formulated as a Markov Decision Process (MDP)
which can be solved to give the optimal mining strategy. However, solving the mining MDP requires knowing the values of various
parameters that characterize the blockchain network model. In real blockchain networks, these parameter values are not easy to obtain
and may change over time. This hinders the use of the MDP model-based solution. In this work, we employ RL to dynamically learn a
mining strategy with performance approaching that of the optimal mining strategy by observing and interacting with the network. Since
the mining MDP problem has a non-linear objective function (rather than linear functions of standard MDP problems), we design a new
multi-dimensional RL algorithm to solve the problem. Experimental results indicate that, without knowing the parameter values of the
mining MDP model, our multi-dimensional RL mining algorithm can still achieve the optimal performance over time-varying blockchain
networks.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Proof-of-work, Selfish Mining, MDP, Reinforcement Learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE early digital cryptocurrencies rely on central au-thorities to settle transactions. Digital cryptocurrencies
did not flourish, until the advent of Bitcoin [1], [2]. To
avoid single points of failure, Bitcoin is designed as a
decentralized system without a central authority that could
be compromised by corruption and attacks [2]. Since the
birth of Bitcoin in 2008, it has become a widely accepted
currency all over the world. In early 2018, the market price
of Bitcoin went as high as 20,000 US dollars, reflecting robust
demands and enthusiasm for Bitcoin by the public.
The security of Bitcoin is built on the foundation technol-
ogy of blockchain. Blockchain contains several key technical
components, including its chained data structure, peer-to-
peer network protocol, and distributed consensus algorithm
[3], [4], [5]. Blockchain has become a cutting-edge technol-
ogy in FinTech [6], Internet of Things (IoT) [7], [8], and sup-
ply chains [9]. The Bitcoins blockchain is not controlled by
a central authority; it is assembled by peers in the network
independently in a distributed manner. In order that the
blockchains maintained by different peers are consistent,
the peers must agree on a single universal truth about
the transactions of Bitcoin through a consensus-building
process.
Consensus in the Bitcoin network is achieved by the
proof-of-work (PoW) consensus algorithm. The idea of PoW
originated in [10] and is rediscovered and exploited in the
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implementation of Bitcoin. PoW provides strong probabilis-
tic consensus guarantee with resilience against up to 1/2
malicious nodes [11], [12]. The successful operation of Bit-
coin demonstrates the practicality of using PoW to achieve
consensus. Subsequent to Bitcoin, many other cryptocurren-
cies, such as Litecoin [13], Ethereum [14], also adopt the
PoW consensus algorithm.
Peers running the PoW consensus algorithm are miners
who compete to solve a difficult cryptographic hash puzzle,
called the PoW problem. The miner who successfully solves
the PoW problem obtains the right to extend the blockchain
with a block consisting of valid transactions. In doing so,
the miner receives a reward in the form of a newly minted
coin written into the added block. Solving the PoW problem
for rewards is called mining, just like mining for precious
metals.
Miners commit computation resources to solve the PoW
problem. Previously, it was believed that the most profitable
mining strategy is honest mining, wherein a miner will
broadcast the newly added block as soon as it has solved
the PoW problem. Let α be the ratio of a particular miner’s
computing power over the computing powers of all miners.
This ratio is also the probability that the miner can solve
the PoW problem before others in each round of an added
block [3]. Over the long term, the rewards to a miner that
executes the honest mining strategy are therefore α fraction
of the total rewards issued by the Bitcoin network. This
is reasonable since miners share the pie in proportion to
their investments. Not known were whether there are other
mining strategies more profitable than honest mining.
Later, the authors of [15] developed a selfish mining
strategy that can earn higher rewards than honest mining.
A selfish miner does not broadcast its mined block imme-
diately; it carries out a block-withholding attack by secretly
ar
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linking its future mined blocks to the withheld mined block.
If the selfish miner can mine two successive blocks before
other miners do, it can broadcast its two blocks at the same
time to override the block mined by others. Since Bitcoin
has an inherent self-adjusting mechanism to ensure that on
average only one block is added to the blockchain every 10
minutes [16], by invalidating the blocks of others (hence,
removing them from the blockchain), the selfish miner
can increase its own profits. For example, with computing
power ratio α = 1/4, the rewards obtained by selfish mining
can be up to 1/3 fraction of the total rewards [15]. Based
on this observation, [17] further proposed various selfish
mining strategies with even higher rewards. Despite the
many versions of selfish mining, the optimal (i.e., most-
profitable) mining strategy remained elusive until [18].
The authors of [18] formulated the mining problem as a
general Markov Decision Process (MDP) with a large state-
action space. The objective of the mining MDP, however, is
not a linear function of the rewards as in standard MDPs.
Thus, the mining MDP cannot be solved using a standard
MDP solver. To solve the problem, [18] first transformed the
mining MDP with the non-linear objective to a family of
MDPs with linear objectives, and then employed a standard
MDP solver over the family of MDPs to iteratively search
for the optimal mining strategy.
The approach in [18] is model-based in that various pa-
rameter values (e.g., α) must be known before the MDP can
be set up. In real blockchain networks, the exact parameter
values are not easy to obtain and may change over time,
hindering the practical adoption of the solution. In this
paper, we propose a model-free approach that solves the
mining MDP using machine learning tools. In particular,
we solve the mining MDP using reinforcement learning
(RL) without the need to know the parameter values in the
mining MDP model.
RL is a machine-learning paradigm, where agents learn
successful strategies that yield the largest long-term reward
from trial-and-error interactions with their environment
[19], [20]. Q-learning is the most popular RL technique [21].
It can learn a good policy by updating a state-action value
function without an operating model of the environment.
RL has been successfully applied in many challenging tasks,
e,g., playing video games [22] and Go [23], and controlling
robotic movements [24].
The original RL algorithm cannot deal with the nonlinear
objective function of our mining problem. In this paper, we
put forth a new multi-dimensional RL algorithm to tackle
the problem. Experimental results indicate that our multi-
dimensional RL mining algorithm can successfully find the
optimal strategy. Importantly, it demonstrates robustness
and adaptability to a changing environment (i.e., parameter
values changing dynamically over time).
2 BLOCKCHAIN PRELIMINARIES
Blockchain is a decentralized append-only ledger for digital
assets. The data of blockchain is replicated and shared
among all participants. Its past recorded data are tamper-
resistant and participants can only append new data to
the tail-end of the chain of blocks. The state of blockchain
is changed according to transactions, and transactions are
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Fig. 1: Data structure of blockchain.
group into blocks that are appended to the blockchain. The
header of the block encapsulates the hash of the preceding
block, the hash of this block, the Merkle root1 of all trans-
actions contained in this block, and a number called nonce
that is generated by PoW. Since each block must refer to its
preceding block by placing the hash of its preceding block
in its header, all the blocks form a chain of blocks arranged
in chronological order. Fig. 1 illustrates the data structure of
blockchain.
2.1 Proof of Work and Mining
In this paper, we focus on a Bitcoin-like blockchain that
adopts the PoW consensus protocol to validate new blocks
in a decentralized manner.2 In each round, the PoW protocol
selects a leader that is responsible for packing transactions
into a block and appends this block to the blockchain.
To prevent adversaries from monopolizing the blockchain,
the leader selection must be approximately random. Since
Bitcoin-like blockchain is permissionless and anonymity is
inherently designed as the goal, it must consider the Sybil
attack where an adversary simply creates many participants
with different identities to increase its probability of being
selected as the leader. To address the above issues, the key
idea behind PoW is that a participant will be randomly
selected as the leader of each round with a probability in
proportion to its computing power.
In particular, blockchain implements PoW using com-
putational hash puzzles. To create a new block, the nonce
placed into the header of the block must be a solution to the
hash puzzle expressed by the following inequality
H (n, p,m) < D (1)
where the nonce n, the hash of the previous block p, the
Merkle root of all included transactions m are taken as the
input of a cryptographic hash function H(·) and the output
of the hash function should fall below a target D that is
small with respect to the whole range of the hash function
outputs. The used hash function (e.g., SHA-256 hash is used
for Bitcoin) satisfies the property of puzzle friendliness [26]:
1. The Merkle root of the transactions is the hash value of the Merkle
tree whose leaves are the transactions [25].
2. There are also blockchains adopting other several consensus algo-
rithms, such as Proof of Stake (PoS), and Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT)
[4].
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it is challenging to guess the nonce to fulfill (1) by a one-
shot try. The only way to solve (1) is to try a large number
of nonces one by one to check if (1) is fulfilled until one
lucky nonce is found. Therefore, the probability of finding
such a nonce is proportional to the computing power of
the participant—the faster the hash function in (1) can be
computed in each trial, the more nounces can be tried per
unit time. Using the blockchain terminology, the process of
computing hashes to find a nonce is called mining, and the
participants involved are called miners.
2.2 Honest Mining Strategy
When a miner tries to append a new block to the latest
legal block by placing the hash of the latest block in the
header of the new block, we say that the miner mines on the
latest block. The blockchain is maintained by miners in the
following manner.
To encourage all miners to mine on, and maintain, the
current blockchain, a reward is given as an incentive to the
miner by placing a coin-mint transaction in its mined block
that credits the miner with some new coins. If the block
is verified and accepted by other peers in the blockchain
network, the reward is effective and thus can be spent on
the blockchain. When a miner has found an eligible nonce, it
publishes his block to the whole blockchain network. Other
miners will verify the nonce and transactions contained in
that block. If the verification of the block is passed, other
miners will mine on the block (implicitly accepting the
block); otherwise, other miners discard the block and will
continue to mine on the previous legal block.
If two miners publish two different legal blocks that refer
to the same preceding block at the same time, the blockchain
is then forked into two branches. This is called forking of
blockchain. Forks in the blockchain because they are man-
ifestations of disagreement among peers on the blockchain
structure. It can also compromise the integrity and security
of the blockchain [27]. To resolve a fork, PoW prescribes that
only the rewards of the blocks on the longest branch (called
the main chain) are effective. Then, miners are incentivized
to mine on the longest branch, i.e., miners always add
new blocks after the last block on the longest main chain
that is observed from their local perspectives. If the forked
branches are of equal length, miners may mine subsequent
blocks on either branch randomly. This is referred to as the
rule of the longest chain extension. Eventually, one branch
will predominate and the other branches are discarded by
peers in the blockchain network.
The mining strategy adhering to the rule of the longest
chain extension and publishing a block immediately after
the block is mined is referred to as honest mining [3], [4], [5].
The miners that comply with honest mining are called hon-
est miners. It was widely believed that the most profitable
mining strategy for miners is honest mining; and that when
all miners adopt honest mining, each miner is rewarded in
proportion to its computing power [3], [4], [5]. As a result,
any rational miner will not deviate from honest mining.
This belief was later shown to be ill-founded and that other
mining strategies with higher profits are possible [15], [17],
[18]. We will briefly discuss these mining strategies in the
next section. For a more concrete exposition, we will first
present the mining model.
3 BLOCKCHAIN MINING MODEL
In this section, we present the Markov Decision Process
(MDP) model for blockchain mining. Ref. [15] first de-
veloped an MDP mining model and used the model to
construct a selfish mining strategy with higher rewards than
honest mining. Then, [17] proposed even more profitable
selfish mining strategies. Recently, [18] extended the MDP
mining models of [15], [17] to a more general form. In this
work, we adopt the mining model of [18].
Without loss of generality, we assume the network is
split into two mining pools: one is an adversary that controls
a fraction α of the whole network’s computing power; the
other is the network of honest miners that controls a fraction
1− α of the computing power of the whole network.
Even if the adversary and an honest miner release their
newly mined blocks to the network simultaneously, the
blocks will not be received by all miners simultaneously due
to propagation delays and network connectivity. We model
the communication capability of the adversary using the
parameter γ, defined as the fraction of the honest miners
that will first receive the block from the adversary when
the adversary and one honest miner release their blocks
approximately at a same time—more specifically, γ(1−α) is
the computing power of the honest network that will mine
on the block of the adversary when the adversary and an
honest miner release their blocks simultaneously.
As in [18], we model blockchain mining as a single-
player MDP M = 〈S,A, P,R〉, where S is the state space,
A is the action space, P is the transition probability matrix
and R is the reward matrix. Each transition is triggered by
the event of a miner mining a new block, whether the block
is mined by the adversary or one of the honest miners. The
action taken by the adversary based on the previous state,
together with the event, determines the next state to which
the system evolves.
The objective of the adversary is to earn rewards higher
than its computational power. To achieve this, the adversary
will generally deviate from honest mining by building a
private chain of blocks without releasing them the moment
the blocks are mined; the adversary will release several
blocks from its private chain at a time to undo the honest
chain opportunistically.
State: Each state in the state space is represented by a
three-tuple form
(
l(a), l(h), fork
)
, where l(a) and l(h) are
respectively the lengths of the adversarys chain and the
honest networks chain after the latest fork (as illustrated
in Fig. 2). In general, fork can take three possible values
(irrelevant, relevant, active). Their meanings will be ex-
plained later.
Action: The action space A includes four actions that can
be executed by the adversary.
• Adopt: The adversary accepts the honest chain and
mines on the last block of the honest chain. This
action discards the l(a) blocks in the chain of the
adversary and it renews the attack from the new
starting point without a fork. This action is allowed
by the MDP model for all l(a) and l(h).
• Override: The adversary publishes one block more
than the honest chain (i.e., l(h) + 1 blocks) to the
whole network. This action overrides the conflicting
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Fig. 2: An illustrating example of the state in the adopted
MDP.
blocks of the honest chain. This action is allowed
when l(a) > l(h).
• Match: The adversary publishes the same number of
blocks as the honest chain (i.e., l(h) blocks) to the
whole network. This action creates a fork deliberately
and initiates an open mining competition between
the two branches of the adversary and the honest
network. This action is allowed when l(a) ≥ l(h) and
fork = relevant.
• Wait: The adversary does not publish blocks and it
just keeps mining on its own chain. This action is
always feasible.
One remark about the actions of the MDP mining model
is that some actions that can generally be performed are
deliberately removed from the action-state space because
these actions are not gainful for the adversary. For example,
when l(a) < l(h), the adversary can still release a certain
number of its blocks. However, since releasing fewer blocks
than the number of blocks on the honest chain will not
increase its probability of mining the next block compared
to mining it privately, these actions thus are excluded from
the allowed actions.
We now explain the three values of the entry fork in the
three-tuple state.
• Relevant: The value of relevant means that the
latest block is mined by the honest network. Now,
if fork = relevant and l(a) ≥ l(h), the action
match is allowed. For example, if the previous state
is
(
l(a), l(h) − 1, •
)
and now the honest network
successfully mines one block, the state then changes
to
(
l(a), l(h), relevant
)
. If at this time, l(a) ≥ l(h),
match is allowed. We remark that match here may
be gainful for the adversary because γ(1−α) comput-
ing power of the honest network would be dedicated
to mining on the adversary chain because of the
near-simultaneous releases of the latest block of the
adversary chain and the latest block of the honest
chain. In this state, as far as the public is concerned,
there no fork yet, since the l(a) mined blocks of the
adversary are private and hidden from the public.
However, if the adversary execute a match from this
state, then a fork will be made known to the public
and an active competition between the two branches
will follow.
• Irrelevant: The value of irrelevant means that
the latest block is mined by the adversary and
the blocks published by the honest network have
been already received by (the majority of) the hon-
est network. Now, even if l(a) ≥ l(h), the action
match is not allowed. For example, if the previous
state is
(
l(a) − 1, l(h), •
)
and now the adversary suc-
cessfully mines a new block, the state changes to(
l(a), l(h), irrelevant
)
. We emphasize that match is
disallowed here even if l(a) ≥ l(h), not because it
cannot be performed in the blockchain, but rather
match here is not gainful for the adversary. If match
were to be performed here, no computing power of
the honest network would shift to mining on the
adversary chain because the miners in the honest
network would have received the latest block of the
honest chain first (well before the current transition
triggered by the adversary mining a new block) and
would have dedicated to mining on the honest chain
already. Again, in this state, there is no fork as far as
the public blockchain is concerned.
• Active: The value of active means that the ad-
versary has executed the action match from the
previous state, and the blockchain is now split
into two branches. For example, if the previous
state is
(
l(a), l(h), relevant
)
with l(a) ≥ l(h) and
the adversary executed the action match. If the
new transition is triggered by the honest network
mining a new block, then the state transitions to(
l(a) − l(h), 1, active
)
. In short, active means a fork
is made known to the public and that an active
competition between the two branches of the fork
is ongoing.
Transition and Reward: After the execution of an action,
the occurrence of each state transition is triggered by the
creation of a new block (either by the adversary or by the
honest network) and the corresponding transition probabil-
ity is the probability of the block created by the adversary
(α) or by the honest network (1 − α). The initial state
is (1, 0, irrelevant) with probability α or (0, 1, irrelevant)
with probability 1 − α. Different actions performed by the
adversary will have different effects on the state transitions.
The specific description is as follows:
• The state transitions after the execution of action
adopt: By executing the adopt action, the adversary
accepts all the blocks on the branch mined by the
honest network and mines on the latest block on the
honest chain together with the honest network. An
illustrating example of the state transitions after the
execution of action adopt is given in Fig. 3. As shown
in Fig. 3, with the probability of α, the adversary
can successfully mine the next block and then the
state transits to (1, 0, relevant); with the probabil-
ity of 1 − α, the honest network can successfully
mine the next block and then the state transits to
(0, 1, relevant).
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Fig. 3: An illustrating example of the state transitions after
the execution of action adopt.
• The state transition after the execution of action
override: The adversary can only perform action
override when the number of the blocks on its
private branch is greater than the number of the
blocks on the honest branch (i.e., when l(a) > l(h)).
By performing override, the adversary publishes
l(h) + 1 blocks from its private branch to overwrite
the latest l(h) blocks on the honest branch. After
that, the branch of the adversary becomes the main
chain and the whole network mines on the latest
block of the adversary’s branch. An illustrating ex-
ample of the state transitions after the execution
of action override is given in Fig. 4. As shown
in Fig. 4, the adversary has the probability of α
to successfully mine the next block and makes the
state transit to
(
l(a) − l(h), 0, irrelevant
)
; the honest
network has the probability of 1 − α to successfully
mine the next block and makes the state transit to(
l(a) − l(h) − 1, 1, relevant
)
.
Probability
Probability
Blocks mined by the adversary (private) 
Blocks mined by the honest network (discarded)
Blocks mined by the honest network
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State:
State:
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Fig. 4: An illustrating example of the state transitions after
the execution of action override.
• The state transition after the execution of action
match: The match action can only be executed when
fork = relevant and when the number of blocks on
the private branch of the adversary is greater than or
equal to the number of blocks on the public branch
of the honest network (i.e., when l(a) ≥ l(h)). After
the adversary performs the match action, a fork
will be formed on the blockchain that is observed
by all the miners. After that, the adversary is still
mining on its own branch; however, due to the fork,
a γ fraction of the honest network will mine on the
branch published by the adversary, and the other
1 − γ fraction of the honest network will mine on
the branch published by the honest network. An
illustrating example of the state transitions after the
execution of action match is given in Fig. 5. As
shown in Fig. 5, the next block may be published by
the adversary on its own branch such that the state
transits to
(
l(a) + 1, l(h), active
)
with the probability
of α; the next block may be published by the honest
network on the branch of the adversary such that
the state transits to
(
l(a) − l(h), 1, relevant
)
with
the probability of γ (1− α); the next block may be
published by the honest network on the branch
of the honest network such that the state transits
to
(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
with the probability of
(1− γ) (1− α). We must emphasize that after the
execution of action match, among the l(a) blocks of
the adversary, some of the blocks may be private
while other blocks are public. Which parts of blocks
are private/public are implied by the state implic-
itly. For example, suppose that the previous state is(
l(a), l(h), relevant
)
with l(a) > l(h) (as illustrated
in the left part of Fig. 5) and the action match is per-
formed. If the adversary subsequently mines a new
block on its own branch, then the state changes to(
l(a) + 1, l(h), active
)
, where there are l(a) +1− l(h)
private blocks and l(h) public blocks among the
l(a)+1 blocks owned by the adversary (as illustrated
by the first case in the right part of Fig. 5). If the
honest miners mine a new block on the adversarys
branch, the state changes to
(
l(a) − l(h), 1, relevant
)
,
where there are l(a) − l(h) private block left for the
adversary (as illustrated by the second case in the
right part of Fig. 5). If the hones miners mine a
new block on the honest networks branch, the state
changes to l(a)−l(h), where there are l(a)−l(h) private
blocks and l(h) public blocks among the l(a) blocks
owned by the adversary (as illustrated by the third
case in the right part of Fig. 5).
• The state transition triggered by action wait: The
wait action means that the adversary does not per-
form any actions and continues to mine on its private
branch. After the action wait is executed, if fork 6=
active, the adversary and the honest network mine
on their own branches respectively. An illustrating
example of the state transitions after the execution
of action match when fork 6= active is given in
Fig. 6. As shown in Fig. 6, when fork 6= active,
the next new block may be mined by the adver-
sary on its own private branch such that the state
changes to
(
l(a) + 1, l(h), irrelevant
)
with the prob-
ability of α; or the next new block may be mined by
the honest network on the public branch such that
the state changes to
(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
with
the probability of 1 − α. After the action wait is
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Fig. 5: An illustrating example of the state transitions after
the execution of action match.
executed, if fork = active, due to the fork that
can be observed by the whole network, the mining
behaviors of all miners are the same as that after
the execution of the match action. An illustrating
example of the state transitions after the execution
of action match when fork = active is given in
Fig. 7. As shown in Fig. 7, when fork = active,
the next new block may be mined by the adversary
on its own branch such that the state changes to(
l(a) + 1, l(h), irrelevant
)
with the probability of α;
or the next new block may be mined by the hon-
est network on the branch of the adversary such
that the state changes to
(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
with the probability of γ (1− α); or the next new
block may be mined by the honest network on the
branch of the adversary such that the state changes
to
(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
with the probability of
(1− γ) (1− α).
The reward is given as a tuple
(
r(a), r(h)
)
, where r(a)
denotes the number of blocks mined by the adversary and
accepted by the whole network, and r(h) denotes the num-
ber of blocks mined by the honest network and accepted
by the whole network. The state transitions and reward
matrices are given in TABLE I.
Objective Function: The objective of the adversary is
to find the optimal mining strategy that can earn as much
reward as possible. Since blockchain keeps adjusting the
mining difficulty (i.e., the mining target on the RHS of
inequality (1)) to ensure that on average one valid block is
introduced to the overall blockchain per valid block interval
(e.g., one block per 10 minutes for Bitcoin, and per 10-20
seconds for Ethereum), the mining objective of the adver-
sary is not to maximize its absolute cumulative reward,
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Fig. 6: An illustrating example of the state transitions after
the execution of action wait when fork 6= active.
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Fig. 7: An illustrating example of the state transitions after
the execution of action wait when fork = active.
but to maximize the ratio of its cumulative rewards over
the cumulative rewards of the whole network (i.e., the
cumulative rewards of the whole network advance by one
reward per block interval—rewards of all miners/Time is
fixed to 1 per block interval; then maximizing adversary
rewards/Time is equivalent to maximizing the ratio of
adversary rewards/Time to rewards of all miners/Time =
adversary rewards/rewards of all miners). We emphasize
that blocks mined by the adversary and the honest network
that are discarded due to losing out in the competition are
not considered as having been successfully introduced to
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the blockchain. Thus, the principle behind the strategy of
the adversary is to maximize the number of blocks mined by
the honest network that are later discarded while reducing
its own discarded blocks.
As in [18], we define the following relative mining gain
(RMG) as the objective function for blockchain mining:
RMG = E
[
lim
T→∞
∑t+T−1
τ=t r
(a)
τ+1∑t+T−1
τ=t r
(a)
τ+1 +
∑t+T−1
τ=t r
(h)
τ+1
]
(2)
where
(
r
(a)
t , r
(h)
t
)
is the tuple of rewards issued in the
block interval t, T is the size of the observing window.
The objective of the adversary is to maximize this relative
mining gain.
Under the above MDP mining model, we can now
interpret honest mining, selfish mining [15], lead stubborn
mining [17] as examples of different mining strategies.
Honest Mining: For honest mining, miners will follow
the rule of the longest chain extension. Thus, they will not
maintain a private chain: when they have a new block, they
will immediately publish it. The honest mining strategy can
be written as
HM
(
l(a), l(h), •
)
=

adopt
wait
l(a) < l(h)
l(a) = l(h)
override l(a) > l(h)
(3)
where we note that l(a), l(h) can only take a value of 0 or 1.
Selfish Mining: The main idea of selfish mining [15] is
described as follows. If one block is found by the adversary,
it does not publish it immediately and it keeps mining
on its private chain. When the adversary already has one
private block and then honest network publishes one block
(immediately after an honest miner mines a new block),
the adversary chooses to publish its block to match the
honest network. This causes γ(1 − α) computing power of
the honest network to mine on the adversarys chain. When
the adversary already has some private blocks and then
honest network catches up with only one block less than
the adversary (l(h) = l(a) − 1 ≥ 1), the adversary overrides
the honest network’s block by publishing all its blocks. The
selfish mining strategy can be written as
SM
(
l(a), l(h), •
)
=

adopt
match
override
l(a) < l(h)
l(a) = l(h) = 1
l(h) = l(a) − 1 ≥ 1
wait otherwise
(4)
Lead Stubborn Mining: Lead stubborn mining [17] is
different from selfish mining in the following way. A lead
stubborn miner always publishes one block from its private
chain to match with the honest network when the honest
network mines a new block if l(a) ≥ l(h). The adversary
never executes the action override. The lead stubborn min-
ing can be written as
LSM
(
l(a), l(h), fork
)
=

adopt
match
l(a) < l(h),∀fork
otherwise
wait l(a) > l(h), fork = irrelevant
(5)
It is shown that this lead stubborn mining can achieve
higher profits than selfish mining [17].
Optimal Mining : Although there are many possible
mining strategies that can obtain profits higher than hon-
est mining, the optimal mining strategy is not obvious.
Since the state-action space of the MDP is huge, it is not
straightforward to derive the optimal mining strategy. The
relative mining gain objective (2) is a nonlinear function
of the rewards, and thus the corresponding MDP cannot
be solved using standard MDP solvers to give the optimal
mining strategy. To solve this problem, [18] first transformed
the MDP with the nonlinear objective to a family of MDPs
with linear objectives, and then employed a standard MDP
solver combined with a numerical search over the family of
MDPs to find the optimal mining strategy. As shown in [18],
its solution indeed can find the optimal mining strategy.
However, the solution of [18] is model-based approach:
it must know the parameters that characterize the MDP
model exactly (i.e., the computing power distribution α, the
communication capability γ). In real blockchain networks,
these parameters are not easy to obtain and may change
over time, hindering the use of the solution proposed in
[18]. We propose a model-free approach that solves the MDP
with the nonlinear objective using RL.
4 MINING THROUGH RL
This section first provides preliminaries for RL and then
presents a new RL algorithm that can derive the optimal
mining strategy without knowing the parameters of the
environment. We propose the new RL mining algorithm
based on Q-learning, one popular algorithm from the RL
family.
4.1 Preliminaries for Original Reinforcement Learning
Algorithm
In RL, an agent interacts with an environment in a sequence
of discrete time steps, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., as shown in Fig. 8. At
time t, the agent observes the state of the environment, st; it
then takes an action, at. As a result of the state-action pair,
(st, at), the agent receives a scalar reward rt+1, and the en-
vironment moves to a new state st+1 at time t+1. Based on
st+1, the agent then decides the next action at+1. The goal of
the agent is to effect a series of rewards {rt}t=1,2,... through
its actions to maximize some performance criterion. For
example, for Q-learning [21], the performance criterion to be
maximized at time t is the discounted accumulated rewards
going forward Rt =
∑∞
τ=t λ
τ−trτ+1, where λ ∈ (0, 1) is a
discount factor for weighting future rewards [19]. In general,
the agent takes actions according to some decision policy pi.
RL methods specify how the agent changes its policy as
a result of its experiences. With sufficient experiences, the
agent can learn an optimal decision policy pi∗ to maximize
the long-term accumulated reward [19].
The desirability of state-action pair (st, at) under a de-
cision policy decision pi is captured by a Q function, de-
fined as Q (s, a) = [Rt |st = s, at = a, pi ], i.e., the expected
discounted accumulated reward going forward given the
current state-action pair (st, at). The optimal decision policy
pi∗ is one that maximizes Q function. In Q-learning, the goal
of the agent is to learn the optimal policy pi∗ through an
online-iterative process by observing the rewards while it
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TABLE 1: The state transitions and reward matrices of the MDP mining model.
Current State, Action Next State Transition Probability Reward(
l(a), l(h), •) , adopt (1, 0, irrelevant) α (0, l(h))
(0, 1, irrelevant) 1− α(
l(a), l(h), •) , override (l(a) − l(h), 0, irrelevant) α (l(h) + 1, 0)(
l(a) − l(h) − 1, 1, relevant) 1− α(
l(a), l(h), irrelevant
)
, wait
(
l(a) + 1, l(h), irrelevant
)
α (0, 0)(
l(a), l(h), relevant
)
, wait
(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
1− α (0, 0)(
l(a), l(h), active
)
, wait
(
l(a) + 1, l(h), active
)
α (0, 0)(
l(a), l(h), relevant
)
,match
(
l(a) − l(h), 1, relevant) γ (1− α) (l(h), 0)(
l(a), l(h) + 1, relevant
)
(1− γ) (1− α) (0, 0)
The action override is allowed when l(a) > l(h); the action match is allowed when l(a) ≥ l(h).
takes action in successive time steps. In particular, the agent
maintains the Q function, Q(s, a), for all state-action pairs
(s, a), in a tabular form.
Let q (s, a) be the estimated action-value function during
the iterative process. At time step t, given state st, the agent
selects a greedy action at = argmaxaq(st, a) based on its
current Q function. This will cause the system to return a
reward rt+1 and move to state st+1. The experience at time
step t is captured by the quadruplet et = (st, at, rt+1, st+1).
At the end of time step t, experience et is used to update
q(st, at) for entry (st, at) as follows:
q (st, at)← (1− β) q (st, at) + β
[
rt+1 + λmax
a′
q (st+1, a
′)
]
(6)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter that governs the learning
rate. Q-learning learns from experiences gathered over time,
{et}t=0,1,..., through the iterative process in (6). Note that Q-
learning is a model-free learning framework in that it tries
to learn the optimal policy without having a model that
describes the operating behavior of the environment beyond
what can be observed through the experiences.
As a deviation from the above description, a caveat in
Q-learning is that the so-called ε-greedy algorithm is often
adopted in action selection. For the ε-greedy algorithm, the
action at = argmaxaq(st, a) is only chosen with probability
1 − ε. With probability ε, a random action is chosen uni-
formly from the set of possible actions. This is to avoid the
algorithm from zooming in to a local optimal policy and
to allow the agent to explore a wider spectrum of different
actions in search of the optimal policy [19].
It has been shown that in a stationary environment that
can be fully captured by an MDP, the Q-values will converge
to optimality if the learning rate decays appropriately and
each action in the state-action pair (s, a) is executed an
infinite number of times in the process [19].
4.2 New Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Mining
The original RL algorithm as presented in Section IV.A
cannot be directly applied to maximize the mining objective
function expressed in (2); there is one fundamental obsta-
cle that must be overcome. The obstacle is the nonlinear
combination of the rewards in the objective function. The
original RL algorithm can only maximize an objective that
is a linear function of the scalar rewards, e.g., the weighted
sum of scalar rewards. To address this issue, we put forth
a new algorithm that aims to optimize the original mining
objective: the multi-dimensional RL algorithm.
Environment
Agent
action
reward
state
t
a
t
r
t
s
1t
r

1t
s

Fig. 8: The agent-environment interaction process of RL
algorithm.
We formulate the multi-dimensional RL algorithm as
follows. At mined block interval 3 t (t = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), the state
st ∈ S takes a value from the state space S as defined
in the MDP model of blockchain mining, and the action
at ∈ A is chosen from the action space A. The state tran-
sition occurs according to TABLE I. The reward is the pair(
r
(a)
t+1, r
(h)
t+1
)
whose value is assigned according to TABLE
I. The experience at the end of mined block interval t is
given by et =
(
st, at, st+1, r
(a)
t+1, r
(h)
t+1
)
. The objective of the
multi-dimensional RL algorithm is to maximize the relative
mining gain as expressed in (2).
For a state-action pair (st, at), instead of
maintaining an action-value scalar Q(s, a), the multi-
dimensional RL algorithm maintains an action-value
pair
(
Q(a)(s, a), Q(h)(s, a)
)
corresponding to the Q
function values of the adversary and the honest network,
respectively. The Q functions defined by Q learning are
the expected cumulative discounted rewards. Specifically,
3. A mined block interval is different from a valid block interval.
A valid block interval separates two valid blocks that are ultimately
adopted by the blockchain. The average duration of a valid block
interval is a constant in many blockchain systems (e.g., 10 min in
bitcoin). The average duration of the valid block interval is defined by
the system designer and its constancy is maintained by adjusting the
mining target. A mined block interval separated two mined (by either
the adversary of the honest network), regardless of whether the blocks
becomes valid later. In the MDP model, each transition is triggered by
the mining of a new block. Thus the average duration of a mined block
interval is the average time separates two adjacent transitions. Due to
the actions of the adversary, some of the mined blocks (by the adversary
of the honest network) may be discarded later.
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Q(a)(s, a) and Q(h)(s, a) are defined as
Q(a)(s, a) = E
[
lim
T→∞
∑T
τ=t
λτ−tr(a)τ+1 |st = s, at = a, pi
]
Q(h)(s, a) = E
[
lim
T→∞
∑T
τ=t
λτ−tr(h)τ+1 | st = s, at = a, pi
]
(7)
Suppose that at mined block interval t, the Q functions in (7)
are estimated to be q(a)(s, a), q(h)(s, a). For action selection,
we still adopt the ε-greedy approach. To select the greedy
action, we construct the following objective function:
f (s, a) =
q(a)(s, a)
q(a)(s, a) + q(h)(s, a)
(8)
After taking action at, the state transitions to st+1 and
the reward pair
(
r
(a)
t+1, r
(h)
t+1
)
is issued. With the experience
et =
(
st, at, st+1, r
(a)
t+1, r
(h)
t+1
)
, the multi-dimensional RL
algorithm updates the two Q functions as follows:
q(a)(st, at)
← (1− β) q(a)(st, at) + β
[
r
(a)
t+1 + λq
(a) (st+1, a
′)
]
q(h)(st, at)
← (1− β) q(h)(st, at) + β
[
r
(h)
t+1 + λq
(h) (st+1, a
′)
] (9)
where a′ = argmaxaf (st+1, a). Note that the update rule
of (9) is very similar to the update rule of Q learning,
except that the greedy action a′ is chosen by maximizing the
constructed objective function in (8) rather than maximizing
the Q function itself as in Q learning. From the expressions
in (7) and (8), we can verify that the adopted objective
function in (8) is consistent with the relative mining gain
objective function defined in (2), except the discount terms
λτ−t used in the computation of the Q functions. The use of
discount terms can ensure that the Q functions can converge
to some bounded values; however, adding discount terms to
the rewards will change the original mining objective. One
simple way to ensure strict objective consistency is to set
λ = 1. Although the setting of λ = 1 will result in unbound
values for the Q functions as the RL iteration gradually
progresses to infinite time steps, this is not a big problem
as long as the Q function values do not overflow during the
execution of the algorithm. In practice, we can also set λ to
be very close to one.
The RL algorithm expressed by the Q function updates in
(9) is our multi-dimensional RL algorithm. We introduce one
additional technical element to the ε-greedy action selection,
as explained in the next paragraph.
As described above, when we select the action, we adopt
the ε-greedy strategy that allows us to select the current
best action (at = argmaxaf (st, a)) with probability 1 − ε
and to randomly select an action with probability ε. This
random action selection is used to explore some unseen
states and can avoid trapping at local optimal maximums.
However, the tuning of parameter ε is not straightforward.
A large ε reduces the possibility of trapping at local optimal
maximums but it also decrease the average reward, since
it wastes a fraction of the time to explore non-optimal
states. In our algorithm, we adopt the following strategy
for dynamically tuning the parameter ε. Denote the number
Algorithm 1 Multi-dimensional RL Algorithm for
Blockchain Mining
Initialize q(a) (s, a) = 0,∀s,∀a;
Initialize q(h) (s, a) = 0,∀s,∀a;
Initialize V (s) = 0,∀s;
Initialize Tε, λ, β;
for t = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
Receive st, rt from the blockchain environment;
Generate action at = SELECTACTION(st);
Input at to the blockchain environment;
Observe st+1, r
(a)
t+1, r
(h)
t+1 from the blockchain environ-
ment;
Compute a′ = argmax
a
q(a)(st+1,a)
q(a)(st+1,a)+q(h)(st+1,a)
Update
q(a)(st, at)
← (1− β) q(a)(st, at) + β
[
r
(a)
t+1 + λq
(a) (st+1, a
′)
]
;
q(h)(st, at)
← (1− β) q(h)(st, at) + β
[
r
(h)
t+1 + λq
(h) (st+1, a
′)
]
;
end for
procedure SELECTACTION(st)
Compute ε (st) = exp
(
−V (st)Tε
)
;
if random < ε (st) then
randomly select an action at from A;
else
at = argmax
a∈A
q(a)(st,a)
q(a)(st,a)+q(h)(st,a)
;
end ifreturn at
end procedure
of times state was visited by V (st). Then, the ε parameter
used at state st for performing ε-greedy action selection is
given by
ε (st) = exp
(
−V (st)
Tε
)
(10)
where Tε is a temperature parameter that governs how fast
we gradually reduce the ε parameter. The pseudo-code of
our multi-dimensional RL algorithm for blockchain mining
is given in Algorithm 1.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
We have conducted simulations to investigate our proposed
RL mining strategy. Following the simulation approach
used in [15], we constructed a Bitcoin-like simulator that
captures all the relevant PoW network details described
in previous sections, except that the crypto puzzle solving
processing was replaced by a Monte Carlo simulator that
simulates the time required for block discovery without
actually attempting to compute a hash function. We simu-
lated 1000 miners mining at identical rates (i.e., they each
can have one simulated hash test at each time step of
the Monte Carlo simulation). A subset of the 1000 miners
(1000α miners) forms an adversary pool running a ma-
licious mining strategy that co-exists with honest mining
adopted by the other 1000(1− α) miners. When co-existing
with honest mining, the malicious mining strategy is one of
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Fig. 9: Achieved mining gain versus α for γ = 1.
the following mining strategies: i) our RL mining strategy,
ii) the optimal mining strategy derived in [18] or iii) the
selfish mining strategy derived in [15]. Upon encountering
two subchains of the same length, we divide the honest
miners such that a fraction γ of them mine on the attacking
pool’s branch while the rest mine on the other branch. The
performance metric used is the relative mining gain (RMG)
computed over a window consisting of Tw = 105 time
steps:
∑t+Tw−1
τ=t r
(a)
τ+1
/(∑t+Tw−1
τ=t r
(a)
τ+1 +
∑t+Tw−1
τ=t r
(h)
τ+1
)
.
The hyper-parameters used in the RL algorithm are set to
as λ = 0.999, β = 0.05.
We first compare the performances of our RL mining,
the optimal-policy mining, and the selfish mining. Fig. 9-
11 plots the mining reward of the adversary versus α for
different values of γ. The relative mining gain of α/(1− α)
is treated as a bound for the mining problem and it can only
be achieved by optimal-policy mining for γ = 1. To derive
the optimal policy, we adopt the search algorithm proposed
in [18] and set the search error to a very tiny number of
10−5. As in [18], we truncate the MDP at l(a) = 100 or
l(a) = 100 for both of optimal-policy mining and RL mining.
The temperature parameter Tε is set to as Tε = 104 and it is
reset to Tε = 0 after t = 108 time steps when convergence
is attained. All the results of RL mining are given after
the algorithm has converged. From the results, we can see
that the performance of our RL mining can converge to the
performance of optimal-policy mining without knowing the
details about the environment model.
We next consider the impact of the temperature param-
eter Tε on the convergence of RL mining. Fig. 12-14 present
the mining rewards obtained by RL mining with different Tε
over time for γ = 1, 0.5, 0, respectively (α is fixed to 0.45).
From the results, we can see that generally, RL mining with
larger Tε can have more explorations and can converge more
closely to the optimal performance; however, RL mining
with larger Tε also have longer exploration phases that
slow down the convergence process. Fig. 15 presents the
mining rewards of RL mining with different Tε for different
α (γ is fixed to 1). The mining reward results are given
after t = 107 time steps and without resetting Tε = 0.
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Fig. 10: Achieved mining gain versus α for γ = 0.5.
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Fig. 11: Achieved mining gain versus α for γ = 0.
We see that for larger α, we need larger Tε to ensure the
convergence of RL mining, although it will slow down
the convergence process. In practice, we can dynamically
reduce the value of Tε when we find that the mining gain
has already converged.
Last, we investigate the mining performances of dif-
ferent mining strategies when the blockchain environment
changes. The experimental results are given in Fig. 16-18.
The blockchain environment starts with parameter values
of (α = 0.35, γ= 1) and the values of (α, γ) change se-
quentially in the experiment. The temperature parameter
Tε of RL mining is fixed to Tε = 103. The optimal-policy
mining strategy adopts the optimal policy for the blockchain
environment with (α = 0.35, γ= 1). We derived the optimal
policy for (α = 0.35, γ= 1) by iteratively exploit the MDP
solver [28] to search over the policy space, as proposed
in [18]. TABLE II describes the found optimal policy for
(α = 0.35, γ= 1) when l(a) ≤ 8 and l(h) ≤ 8. The per-
formances of the optimal policy for (α = 0.35, γ= 1), and
the selfish mining are treated as benchmarks for our RL
mining in the changing blockchain environment. From the
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Fig. 12: Achieved mining gain versus time step for different
Tε and γ = 1, α = 0.45.
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Fig. 13: Achieved mining gain versus time step for different
Tε and γ = 0.5, α = 0.45.
simulation results, we can see that when the environment
has changed, the optimal-policy mining strategy derived
from the MDP model is not optimal anymore; our RL
mining can adaptively learn the optimal policy for differ-
ent environments. This demonstrates the advantage of RL
mining over these model-based mining strategies.
6 CONCLUSION
We employed RL algorithms to solve the mining MDP prob-
lem of Bitcoin-like blockchains. We showed that, without
knowing parameters about the blockchain network model,
our RL mining can achieve the mining reward of the optimal
policy that requires knowledge of the parameters. Therefore,
in a dynamic environment in which the parameter values
can change over time, RL mining can be more robust.
Going forward, we will investigate two issues that need
to be addressed before RL mining can be practical:
1. More complete MDP model as proposed in [29]
for blockchain networks—This model incorporates detailed
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Fig. 14: Achieved mining gain versus time step for different
Tε and γ = 0, α = 0.45.
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Fig. 15: Achieved mining gain versus the α for γ = 1 and
different Tε.
blockchain features, such as stale block rate, double spend-
ing attack, and eclipsed attack, that have been precluded by
the model in the current paper. The large action-space of
the complete model will make it more challenging for RL
mining to learn an optimal strategy.
2. Cost of lagged time in convergence—Since miners
need to pay for their hardware and consume electricity to
mine blocks, fast convergence of the mining algorithm is im-
portant from the economical standpoint. Deep RL [22] that
incorporates deep neural networks into RL can potentially
speed up the convergence rate. We will consider the exploit
of deep RL in our future work.
REFERENCES
[1] A. M. Antonopoulos, Mastering Bitcoin: unlocking digital cryptocur-
rencies. O’Reilly Media, Inc., 2014.
[2] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,”
[Online]. Available: http://bitcoin.org, 2008.
WHEN BLOCKCHAIN MEETS AI: OPTIMAL MINING STRATEGY ACHIEVED BY MACHINE LEARNING 12
TABLE 2: The optimal policy for the blockchain environ-
ment with (α = 0.35, γ= 1) when l(a) ≤ 8 and l(h) ≤ 8.
l(a)l(h) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 *** *a* *** *** *** *** *** ***
2 w** *m* *w* *a* *** *** *** ***
3 w** *oo w** *w* *a* *** *** ***
4 w** *m* oo* w** *w* *a* *** ***
5 w** *mw *m* oo* w** *w* *w* *a*
6 w** *mw *mw *m* oo* w** ww* *w*
7 w** *mw *mw *mw *m* oo* w** ww*
8 w** *mw *mw *mw *mw *m* oo* w**
0 1 2
t 106
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
m
in
in
g 
re
wa
rd
 ( , ) = (0.35,1) ( , ) = (0.35,0.5)  ( , ) = (0.35,0)
RL mining
selfish mining
optimal policy for ( , ) = (0.35,1)
Fig. 16: Achieved mining gain when the environment is
changing and the values of (α, γ) change in the following
order: (0.35,1), (0.35, 0.5), and (0.35,0).
[3] F. Tschorsch and B. Scheuermann, “Bitcoin and beyond: A techni-
cal survey on decentralized digital currencies,” IEEE Communica-
tions Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2084–2123, 2016.
[4] W. Wang, D. T. Hoang, P. Hu, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, P. Wang, Y. Wen,
and D. I. Kim, “A survey on consensus mechanisms and mining
strategy management in blockchain networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 7,
pp. 22 328 – 22 370, 2019.
[5] D. Puthal, N. Malik, S. P. Mohanty, E. Kougianos, and G. Das, “Ev-
erything you wanted to know about the blockchain: Its promise,
components, processes, and problems,” IEEE Consumer Electronics
Magazine, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 6–14, 2018.
[6] K. Fanning and D. P. Centers, “Blockchain and its coming impact
on financial services,” Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance,
vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 53–57, 2016.
[7] M. A. Ferrag, M. Derdour, M. Mukherjee, A. Derhab, L. Maglaras,
and H. Janicke, “Blockchain technologies for the internet of things:
Research issues and challenges,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 2188–2204, 2018.
[8] H.-N. Dai, Z. Zheng, and Y. Zhang, “Blockchain for internet of
things: A survey,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 6, no. 5, pp.
8076–8094, 2019.
[9] S. A. Abeyratne and R. P. Monfared, “Blockchain ready manufac-
turing supply chain using distributed ledger,” 2016.
[10] C. Dwork and M. Naor, “Pricing via processing or combatting
junk mail,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer,
1992, pp. 139–147.
[11] J. Garay, A. Kiayias, and N. Leonardos, “The bitcoin backbone
protocol: Analysis and applications,” in Annual International Con-
ference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques.
Springer, 2015, pp. 281–310.
[12] R. Pass, L. Seeman, and A. Shelat, “Analysis of the blockchain
protocol in asynchronous networks,” in Annual International Con-
ference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques.
Springer, 2017, pp. 643–673.
0 1 2
t 106
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
m
in
in
g 
re
wa
rd
 ( , ) = (0.35,1) ( , ) = (0.35,0)  ( , ) = (0.35,0.5)
RL mining
selfish mining
optimal policy for ( , ) = (0.35,1)
Fig. 17: Achieved mining gain when the environment is
changing and the values of (α, γ) change in the following
order: (0.35,1), (0.35, 0), and (0.35,0.5).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
t 106
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
m
in
in
g 
re
wa
rd
 ( , ) = (0.35,1) ( , ) = (0.35,0)  ( , ) = (0.15,0)
RL mining
selfish mining
optimal policy for ( , ) = (0.35,1)
Fig. 18: Achieved mining gain when the environment is
changing and the values of (α, γ) change in the following
order: (0.35,1), (0.35, 0), and (0.15,0).
[13] C. Lee, “Litecoin-open source p2p digital currency,” [Online].
Available: https://litecoin.com/en/, 2011.
[14] V. Buterin, “Ethereum: A next-generation smart contract
and decentralized application platform,” [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper, 2014.
[15] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer, “Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is
vulnerable,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 61, no. 7, pp. 95–102,
2018.
[16] D. Kraft, “Difficulty control for blockchain-based consensus sys-
tems,” Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications, vol. 9, no. 2, pp.
397–413, 2016.
[17] K. Nayak, S. Kumar, A. Miller, and E. Shi, “Stubborn mining: Gen-
eralizing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack,” in
2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).
IEEE, 2016, pp. 305–320.
[18] A. Sapirshtein, Y. Sompolinsky, and A. Zohar, “Optimal selfish
mining strategies in bitcoin,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 2016, pp. 515–532.
[19] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
MIT press, 2018.
[20] L. P. Kaelbling, M. L. Littman, and A. W. Moore, “Reinforcement
learning: A survey,” Journal of artificial intelligence research, vol. 4,
WHEN BLOCKCHAIN MEETS AI: OPTIMAL MINING STRATEGY ACHIEVED BY MACHINE LEARNING 13
pp. 237–285, 1996.
[21] C. J. Watkins and P. Dayan, “Q-learning,” Machine learning, vol. 8,
no. 3-4, pp. 279–292, 1992.
[22] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. A. Rusu, J. Veness, M. G.
Bellemare, A. Graves, M. Riedmiller, A. K. Fidjeland, G. Ostrovski
et al., “Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning,”
Nature, vol. 518, no. 7540, p. 529, 2015.
[23] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan, I. Antonoglou, A. Huang,
A. Guez, T. Hubert, L. Baker, M. Lai, A. Bolton et al., “Mastering
the game of go without human knowledge,” Nature, vol. 550, no.
7676, p. 354, 2017.
[24] J. Schulman, S. Levine, P. Abbeel, M. Jordan, and P. Moritz, “Trust
region policy optimization,” in International conference on machine
learning, 2015, pp. 1889–1897.
[25] R. C. Merkle, “A digital signature based on a conventional en-
cryption function,” in Conference on the theory and application of
cryptographic techniques. Springer, 1987, pp. 369–378.
[26] M. Wang, M. Duan, and J. Zhu, “Research on the security criteria
of hash functions in the blockchain,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM
Workshop on Blockchains, Cryptocurrencies, and Contracts. ACM,
2018, pp. 47–55.
[27] V. Bagaria, S. Kannan, D. Tse, G. Fanti, and P. Viswanath, “De-
constructing the blockchain to approach physical limits,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.08092, 2018.
[28] I. Chade`s, G. Chapron, M.-J. Cros, F. Garcia, and R. Sabbadin,
“Mdptoolbox: a multi-platform toolbox to solve stochastic dy-
namic programming problems,” Ecography, vol. 37, no. 9, pp. 916–
920, 2014.
[29] A. Gervais, G. O. Karame, K. Wu¨st, V. Glykantzis, H. Ritzdorf, and
S. Capkun, “On the security and performance of proof of work
blockchains,” in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC conference on
computer and communications security. ACM, 2016, pp. 3–16.
